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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is a contract action to recover $5,700 J. Douglas 
Jacobsen ("Jacobsen") loaned to Mollie Kimball ("Kimball") to 
purchase a Fiat car in February, 1981. The case was tried to the 
Honorable Maurice D. Jones in the Fifth Circuit Court, State of 
Utah, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department. The trial court's 
jurisdiction was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (1987), which 
provides circuit courts with civil jurisdiction if the sum 
claimed is less than $10,000. Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of 
Appeals is based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (c) (1987) 
granting the Court appellate jurisdiction over appeals from 
circuit courts. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. What is the Utah Court of Appeals1 standard of review in 
reviewing the trial court!s Findings of Fact? 
2. Are the trial court's findings clearly erroneous? 
3. Did the trial court properly limit consideration of 
evidence of goods and services supplied to Jacobsen to the issue 
of Jacobsen's intent with respect to the $5,700? 
4. Does the four-year statute of limitations bar Jacobsen1s 
claim? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE OF CASE 
Jacobsen filed his Complaint March 27, 1985. Kimball 
1 
answered denying the loan, claiming the $5,700 was a gift, and 
claiming the statute of limitations barred Jacobsen's claim. The 
matter was tried without a jury before the Honorable Maurice D. 
Jones on September 23, 1986. After trial, the court wrote, 
"(B)ased upon Mrs. Kimball's testimony on cross-examination, the 
evidence preponderates in favor of the Plaintiff's claim— 
$5,700.00, interest and costs. Judgment as prayed.11 
On November 28, 1986, the court entered Findings of Fact 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. The Findings of Fact provide 
as follows: 
1. On February 8, 1981, Plaintiff loaned Defendant 
$5,700 for her to purchase a 1979 Fiat car from Wayne 
Schilling. 
2. Defendant told Plaintiff that she would pay him 
back the $5,700. 
3. Defendant told Plaintiff that when she sold her old 
car, she would pay him the money from that sale and would 
get the rest of the $5,700 to him as she made it. 
4. Defendant put an ad in the newspaper to sell her 
old car and sold it within a couple of months. 
5. Based upon Defendant's own testimony, the evidence 
preponderates in favor of Plaintiff's claim. 
On December 5, 1986, Kimball filed a Motion For New Trial, 
and a Motion To Stay Judgment and Amend Findings of Fact. The 
court denied Kimball's Motion For New Trial and Motion to Stay 
Proceedings and Amend Findings of Fact, and amended its original 
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Judgment to provide for interest on the $5,700 from November 28, 
1986. 
Kimball filed her Notice of Appeal March 24, 1987. The $300 
cost bond required by Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals 
has not yet been filed. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Loan or Gift Facts. Jacobsen!s home was at 1050 Wood 
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 21, lines 15,16) where he lived 
with his daughter, Sallee. Kimball's home was at #475 Loren Von 
Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 34, line 15) where she lived 
with her children (Tr. 38, lines 7,8). 
On February 8, 1981, Kimball called Jacobsen at his home and 
asked him to come up to her house and go look at a car. She had 
seen the car advertised for sale in the newspaper (Tr. 21, lines 
20-25). Jacobsen drove to Kimball's house and they got in her 
old Fiat and drove to Wayne Schillings1 place (Tr. 22. lines 6-
7). They looked at the car, drove the car, and left. Jacobsen 
asked Kimball if she wanted the car. She said that she did not 
have the money, and Jacobsen told Kimball that he could probably 
loan her the money (Tr. 22, line 10). 
They returned to Wayne Schilling's place and paid him $100 
to hold the car. They then drove to Jacobsen's home where 
Jacobsen had his daughter, Sallee, write a $5,700 check payable 
to Wayne Schilling (Tr. 22, line 15). Jacobsen delivered the 
check to Kimball as a loan (Tr. 26. lines 2-5). They then drove 
to Wayne Schilling's place and picked up the new Fiat and then 
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drove both Fiats back to Kimball's house (Tr. 22. lines 15-16). 
Kimball told Jacobsen that she would sell the old Fiat and 
apply the proceeds on the loan (Tr. 22, lines 23-25). 
Kimball said: "I think when we first set up this, that I 
would pay him for the car whatever I got out of the green (old 
Fiat) car. I may have made the statement that I would, when I 
got more money, I would pay the rest of it . . .If (Tr. 52, lines 
22-25 and Tr. 53., line 1). 
Kimball also said: "I told him (Jacobsen) when I sold my 
car, I would give him that money and that I would get the rest of 
it to him as I made it." (Tr. 53, lines 5-6.) 
Expenses, Services and Property Facts. Jacobsen and 
Kimball were never married to each other. Jacobsen did live with 
Kimball when she would let him (Tr. 27, lines 2-20). Jacobsen 
worked for Buehner Construction Company and was often out of 
town. He was home on weekends for a day and a half a week 
frequently during 1979 through 1985 (Tr. 27, lines 14-15). He 
was gone for three months while working on a project in Cali-
fornia. 
(a) Expenses and Services 
Kimball paid the expenses on her house where she 
resided with her children. She had three children with her 
part of the time and two children with her the other time. 
She paid her house payment, utilities, upkeep and repair of 
appliances. Jacobsen paid the expenses on his house where 
he resided with his daughter, Sallee. He paid his house 
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payment, utilities, upkeep and repair of appliances. 
Jacobsen did live at Kimball's house when home on week-
ends when she would let him. Jacobsen did do physical work 
around Kimball's house and did fix her cars. 
(b) Trailer Sale Proceeds 
Jacobsen gave Kimball $8,000, money from a trailer he 
sold, to put in an account for him when he needed it (Tr. 
29, line 11). It was a weekend, and he was heading out of 
town at the time (Tr. 30., line 2). It was his money (Tr. 
29, line 24). She returned it to him. 
(c) Bronze Statue 
Jacobsen never did give a bronze statue to Kimball (Tr. 
30, line 11). He did take it to her house and put it on her 
piano. 
(d) Silver 
Jacobsen was heading out of town. There was nobody at 
his house. He asked Kimball to keep the silver for him (Tr. 
30, line 11). She said she would. It was his silver (Tr. 
51, line 8). She returned it to him. 
(e) Boat 
Kimball loaned her son $800 to buy a boat (Tr. 51, 
lines 18-20). Later, Kimballfs son got in financial 
problems and was selling the boat (Tr. 51, lines 22-23). 
Jacobsen bought the boat for $400 (Tr. 51, line 25; Tr. 52, 
line 2). 
Statute of Limitation Facts. On February 8, 1981, 
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Jacobsen told Kimball that he could probably loan her $5,700 to 
buy a car (Tr. 22, line 10). 
Jacobsen had his daughter, Sallee, write a $5,700 check 
payable to Wayne Schilling (Tr. 22, line 15), and Jacobsen 
delivered the check to Kimball as a loan (Tr. 26. lines 2-5). 
Kimball told Jacpbsen she was obligated to give him the money 
from the other car (when sold) and she told him she would (Tr. 
40, line 22). They then picked up the new Fiat and drove both 
cars back to Kimball!s house (Tr. 22. lines 15-16). 
Kimball told Jacobsen that she would sell the old Fiat and 
apply the proceeds on the loan (Tr. 22, lines 23-25). In her 
deposition and at trial, Kimball said: "I think when we first set 
up this, that I would pay him for the car whatever I got out of 
the green (old Fiat) car. I may have made the statement that I 
would, when I got more money, I would pay the rest of it . . . . " 
(Tr. 52, lines 22-25 and Tr. 53., line 1.) Kimball also said: "I 
told him (Jacobsen) when I sold my car, I would give him that 
money and that I would get the rest of it to him as I made it." 
(Tr. 53, lines 5-6.) 
The old Fiat was sold in "two, two and one-half, maybe three 
months" (Tr. 22, line 25). Kimball put an ad in the newspaper 
after she got the new Fiat. She doesnft have a date on the sale 
(Tr. 41, line 3). In Kimball's deposition, she said she put an 
ad in the paper and tried to sell the old Fiat, within a couple 
of months (Tr. 52, lines 15-17). At trial, she guessed it would 
be a month or less (Tr. 41, line 7). 
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Kimball got $2,800 from the old Fiat sale (Tr. 40, line 25). 
Jacobsen told her to put the money in an account (Tr. 22, line 
25), and that "when I need it, I111 get it." (Tr. 23, line 1.) 
Jacobsen told Kimball he would let her know when he needed it 
(Tr. 28, line 2). Kimball told him she would put (the money) in 
a special account, add to it, and pay him back (Tr. 24, lines 1-
3). 
Following Plaintiff Jacobsenfs presentation of its case in 
chief, Defendant Kimball moved to dismiss on the basis of the 
statute of limitations. The trial court Judge, Maurice D. Jones, 
denied the motion and stated that the evidence was that the 
payments were to start at the time the old Fiat was sold, which 
was after March 27, 1981 (Tr. 33, lines 12-16). 
Jacobsen mentioned the matter to Kimball about once every 
six months (Tr. 28, line 8). In August, 1981, Jacobsen, Kimball 
and Jacobsenfs daughter, Sallee, were driving to a wedding 
reception. Sallee asked Kimball about the money (Tr. 24, line 
25). Kimball said that she "had it in a personal account and 
that she would pay it back in one lump sum." (Tr. 25, lines 1-
2.) The money sat in the account and Jacobsen waited to be paid 
(Tr. 25, line 6). In 1983, Kimball told Jacobsen she wanted to 
break off the relationship, and that as far as she was concerned, 
hef d been compensated for the car (Tr. 43, lines 18-25). She 
severed the relationship in August, 1984 (Tr. 43, line 11). 
Jacobsen filed his complaint to recover the $5,700 loan March 27, 
1985. Jacobsen has never received any payment on the $5,700 (Tr. 
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25, line 8)• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly found that Jacobsen loaned Kimball 
$5,700. The court made five factual findings which supported its 
conclusion that the $5,700 payment was a loan. There is substan-
tial evidence to support the court's findings. Further, under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the court's rulings should 
not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. Specifi-
cally, the court's findings that Kimball's own testimony prepon-
derates in favor of finding the payment a loan, and the court's 
finding that the sale of Kimball's old car took place after March 
27, 1981 were not clearly erroneous. 
The court properly limited the admissibility of certain 
testimony and evidence, and the statute of limitations is not a 
bar. Payments on the loan were to start when Kimball sold the old 
Fiat. The court properly found the sale took place after March 
27, 1981. It was not until August, 1983, that Kimball told 
Jacobsen that she was not going to pay him back. He filed suit 
March 27, 1985. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURT SHOULD NOT OVERTURN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT UNLESS THEY ARE 
"CLEARLY ERRONEOUS." 
This Court's review of a trial court's findings of fact is 
governed by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987); Ashton v. Ashton, 
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733 P.2d 147, 149-50 (Utah 1987); Salt Lake City School District 
v, Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P. 2d 284, 285 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). Rule 52(a) was amended effective January 1, 1987 to 
provide as follows: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specifically and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant 
to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which con-
stitute the grounds of its action. Requests for 
findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses. The findings of a master to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court following the close 
of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court . . . . 
(Emphasis added) 
Appellant Kimball's contention that a different standard of 
review at present applies in equity cases is erroneous. In 
Ashton, the Utah Supreme Court noted that since July 1, 1985, 
Article VIII of the Utah Constitution has not made a distinction 
between equity cases and cases at law. 733 P.2d at 150 n.l. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently given lower courts 
guidance in applying the Rule 52(a) "clearly erroneous" standard. 
In State v. Walker, 64 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 10-11 (Aug. 25, 1987), 
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the court notes that the language of Utah's Rule 52(a) is similar 
to that of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court 
continues: 
The definition of "clearly erroneous" in the federal 
rules comes from United States v. United States Gypsum 
Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948): 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when 
although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed. 
Further clarification is offered by Wright & Miller: 
The appellate court . . . does not consider 
and weigh the evidence de novo. The mere 
fact that on the same evidence the appellate 
court might have reached a different result 
does not justify it in setting the findings 
aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. 
Thus, the content of Rule 52(a)fs "clearly erroneous" 
standard, imported from the federal rule, requires that 
if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made, the findings . . . will be set aside. 
Although we have applied the new Rule 52(a) since its 
effective date, see, e.g., Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 
147 (Utah 1987); Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah 
1987), we have not examined the impact of drawing from 
the federal rules in the promulgation of our new 
Rule 52. Therefore, we disavow language in our earlier 
cases describing or implying a standard under new Rule 
52(a) which differs in any significant respect from the 
standard of review applied in this case. 
Id. (Emphasis added) 
In this case, the weight of evidence supports the trial 
court's findings. First, the court found that the parties 
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intended the $5,700 payment as a loan. The weight of evidence 
supports this finding. Four witnesses testified at trial. The 
clear testimony of three of the four, including Kimball herself, 
was that the payment was not a gift, but a loan. On direct 
examination Kimball testified as follows: 
Q. Did you make any suggestion to him [Jacobsen] that 
you would pay it [the $5,700] back? 
A. Yes. I told him I felt obligated to give him the 
money from the other car, and I told him I would. 
(Tr. at 40.) Similarly, on cross-examination, Kimball testified 
the payment was not a gift: 
Q. Do you also recall saying in your deposition, 
quote, "I think when we first set up this, that I would 
pay him for the car whatever I got out of the green 
car. I may have made the statement that I would, when 
I got more money, I would pay the rest of it, never 
[sic] putting it into a special account11? 
A. I believe so. There was a lot said about the car. 
Q. Do you recall me asking you, did you ever tell 
Doug, Mr. Jacobsen, that you would pay him back the 
5,700, and answering, "I told him when I told [sic] my 
car, I would give him that money and that I would get 
the rest of it to him as I made it." 
A. Yes. I think so. 
The testimony of Jacobsen and of Jacobsen!s daughter, Sallee, is 
to the same effect. For instance, on direct examination, 
Jacobsen testifies the payment was a loan: 
Q. —1981? All right. What next happened? 
A. I drove up to her house and we got in her old Fiat 
and we went down to Wayne (Shilling's, she drove the 
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car, or we both drove it, I mean, and then she—then we 
left, and I said, do you want it or not, itfs a pretty 
good deal. She goes, oh, I ain't got the money, and I 
says, well I can probably loan you the money, and I 
says, and then we headed out of Wayne, made a U-turn 
when she said, yeah, I want it. We come back and wrote 
Wayne a hundred dollar check to hold it for him until 
we got back. 
Q. And then what did you do? 
A. Went home, got the check from Sal lee, gave it to 
Molly, went back to Wayne's, got the car, drove both 
Fiats to her house. 
Q. Well, [what happened next] with regards to the car. 
A. To the car? 
Q. Un huh. 
A. Well, she said the—the older Fiat, she'd sell it 
for the payment on the newer one, and then when she did 
sell it, she said that I—I sold the car, and I said 
well, put it in an account and when I need it, I'll get 
it. 
(Tr. at 23-23). The trial court's finding that the evidence 
preponderates in favor of Jacobsen's claim is not clearly 
erroneous. 
Second, the trial court found that Kimball's old car was 
sold "within a couple of months" after the purchase of the new 
car. Similarly, in open court in ruling on Kimball's motion to 
dismiss based on the statute of limitations, the trial court 
found: "The evidence at this point is that the payments were to 
start at the time the other car was sold, that's the way I 
understood the plaintiff's version of this, and so that would 
take it beyond the March 27th date. That is the ground upon 
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which I will deny your motion to dismiss." These findings are 
not clearly erroneous. Jacobsen testified that the sale of 
Kimball fs old car, the proceeds of which were to be the first 
payment to Jacobsen, did not take place until some two to three 
months after the February 8th $5,700 loan (Tr. at 23-23). 
Kimball testified that she guessed the sale could have taken 
place within a month or less (Tr. at 41). The court resolved 
this conflicting testimony in favor of Jacobsen, and the court's 
resolution is not clearly erroneous, especially considering Rule 
52(a)'s direction that due regard be given the opportunity of the 
trial judge to judge the credibility of witnesses. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED CONSIDERATION 
OF EVIDENCE OF GOODS AND SERVICES SUPPLIED TO 
JACOBSEN TO THE ISSUE OF JACOBSENfS INTENT 
WITH RESPECT TO THE $5,700. 
The court's limitation on the admission of "goods and 
services evidence" is not in error for a number of reasons. 
First, Kimball never formally offered the evidence for any 
purpose other than "gift motivation." At the beginning of the 
trial, the court questioned Kimball with respect to the subject 
evidence (Tr. at 7-8). In that exchange, the court indicated a 
tentative ruling, should Jacobsen object to the admission of the 
evidence as "an offset." However, Kimball never attempted to so 
introduce the evidence. Having failed to urge its admissability 
as an offset at trial, Kimball cannot claim the court erred in 
failing to consider the evidence on the question of offset. 
Second, assuming the tentative exchange with the court was 
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sufficient to properly raise the issue, the court properly 
refused to consider the evidence on the question of offset. In 
Utah Dept. of Trans, v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Utah 1984), 
the Utah Supreme Court noted that a trial court's rulings with 
respect to the admission of evidence should not be overturned 
absent abuse of discretion. In this case, the trial judge's 
ground for limiting the admission of this evidence was Kimball's 
failure to plead offset as an affirmative defense. While the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provide liberal standards for curing the variance between 
pleading and proof, there is authority in Utah for excluding 
evidence for failure to plead. See Youngren v. John W. Lloyd 
Construction Co. , 22 Utah 2d 207, 450 P.2d 985, 986-87 (Utah 
1969); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 
P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1965). In this case, Kimball made no 
attempt, at any time before, or after trial to amend her plead-
ings. Nor were there any special circumstances which might 
justify such a failure. Under such circumstances, the court's 
ruling cannot be considered an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, an error committed was harmless. The evidence 
excluded went only to the value of the goods and services 
rendered to Jacobsen. Kimball neither pled nor attempted to 
prove any liability for such goods and services, either by way of 
contract or some equitable doctrine. Kimball's evidence, 
therefore, was insufficient to have any legal effect. 
Kimball commends to the court the case of Marvin v., Marvin, 
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557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal . Rptr, 815 (1976) (enbanc), for its 
analysis of property rights between parties who live together, 
though unmarried. Based on this case, Kimball urges her debt be 
discharged on some subtle concept of fair division of property, 
Marvin, however, rejects any division of property not based on 
principles of express or implied contract, 557 P. 2d at 110, 116, 
122-23, and Kimball has not pled such. Further, to the extent 
Kimball attempts to assert causes of action based on express 
contract, implied contract, or domestic relations, she should be 
barred for having failed to present such claims below. See 
Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co. 723 P.2d 388, 392 
(Utah 1980); General Appliance Corp. v. Haws, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 
238, 516 P.2d 346, 348 (1973). 
POINT IV. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR 
JACOBSEN'S CLAIMS. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1987), civil actions may be 
commenced only "after the cause of action has accrued . . .." In 
this case, the trial judge found that Kimball's repayment 
obligation with respect to the loan was not to start until she 
sold her car. The judge further found that Kimball did not sell 
her car until after March 27, 1981. Under such circumstances, a 
complaint filed March 27, 1985 is within the statute of limita-
tions prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1987). 
Kimball, however, contends that there was no agreement as to 
the time of repayment. To the extent the court finds there was 
no such agreement, this case is controlled by 0fHair v. Kounalis, 
23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d 799 (1970). In that case, 0'Hair 
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brought suit to recover the unpaid portions of a series of loans, 
and the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations (§ 78-12-
25). The trial court granted summary judgment and the Utah 
Supreme Court reversed. The evidence, the court noted, revealed 
the following: 
According to plaintiff's version of the contract it was 
the intention of the parties that repayment was to be 
in the future. Respondents emphasized that plaintiff 
in her deposition states in one place that repayment 
was to be in five or six years and in another that it 
would be three, four, or five years; respondents 
therefore conclude there is no way to determine when 
repayment was to be made. 
Id. at 800. 
The court then quotes Grayson v. Crawford, 189 Okl. 546, 119 
P. 2d 42, 45-46 (1941) for the following rule which the court 
finds applicable to O'Hair: 
[A] reasonable time for performance is allowed, when 
the evidence indicates that the cause of action did not 
accrue at the time the money was loaned, and the 
parties, although they did not fix a definite date, 
intended that payment was to be made at a future time. 
Under such circumstances, the statute of limitations 
does not begin to run until a reasonable time has 
elapsed. What is a reasonable time is a question to be 
determined from consideration of all the facts and 
circumstances in the case in which the question arises. 
O'Hair, 463 P.2d at 800-01. 
In this case, as in O'Hair, there is some uncertainty in the 
evidence as to when the loan was to be repaid. If the parties 
did not fix a definite date for repayment, then a reasonable time 
is allowed. Jacobsen loaned Kimball the $5,700 on February 8th. 
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A reasonable time would certainly allow her at least two months 
before her debt became due and payable. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should sustain Judge Maurice D. Jonesfs 
judgment and findings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z.2 day of September, 1987. 
MI: 
MARSDEN, OR^ON & CAHOON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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